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Abstract: The real-time services offered by modern high speed networks are complex enough to 
prompt a new look at how these services should be paid for. In this article, it is motivated that 
paying for the use of guaranteed services can ensure fairness in the availability of limited data 
communication resources. 
The limitations of conventional accounting frameworks for communication services are discussed . 
A new framework for accounting in high speed networks is proposed and the advantages thereof 
pointed out . A quotation and the payment are included as part of the basic protocol to establish 
a channel . This saves the cost of recording usage information for every user , sending out invoices 
and collecting payments. It furthermore makes it possible for users to use and pay for services 
provided by distant service providers with whom they do not have an account . It is proposed that 
users pay a flat rate connection fee for unguaranteed services, but pay more if the services are 
guaranteed. 
Finally the importance of a service reservation protocol , and of the guarantees offered by these 
protocols are pointed out . 
Keywords: Computer Networks, Invoicing, Billing, Digital Cash. 
Computing Review Category: G .2 .0 ,  C.2 .2 ,  C.2 .3 .  
1 Introduction 
Paying for the use of a computer communication network may be a controversial idea. Some 
researchers attribute INTERNET's success to the fact that it has been virtually free of charge for 
most of its users. 
Although this investigation is not focused on the INTERNET, it is still important to take note of 
the recent awareness of the cost of providing INTERNET services . In an article on charging for 
INTERNET services [Dav94] , Dai Davies1 mentions that: 
"Freeness leads to a lack of respect for facilities and discourages investment . The 
problem that needs to be addressed is a creative approach to pricing." 
High speed networks (Gigabit+) are just emerging from the laboratories .  Real-time applications 
such as video conferencing are a reality. According to studies by Parris, these high speed networks 
offer qualities of service (QOS) which are complex enough to warrant a new look at pricing in 
integrated networks (PF92) . 
1 Dai Davies is joint manager of DANTE, the company set up by the European National Research Network to 
provide international services. 
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Pricing is the process by which the service provider determines the price that the user must pay. 
It usually follows a process of costing by which the cost of providing the service is determined . 
Pricing and its effect on network utilization have been studied quite extensively [CPF92, Zha91] . 
Although pricing and costing may be important , these are a financial issue best left to the 
economists . In this investigation , costing and pricing have not been studied directly. The study 
concentrated more on the technical mechanisms (protocols, etc . )  needed to implement a network 
accounting system. For the purposes of this article , accounting is defined to include the processes 
of recording usage information, sending out invoices and collecting payments. In particular ,  the 
issues involved in implementing an accounting system as part of the basic communication protocol 
were studied. 
Instead of relying on the big service providers to decide how the users will pay for services ( which 
favours the formation of monopolies) , one of the underlying objectives of this study was to investi­
gate a payment system which will make it possible for smaller service providers to become part of 
a larger networking service - and which will give the users the freedom to choose which provider 
they want to use. 
The cost of accounting can be very high and can form a substantial part of the total cost of 
providing a networking service. Because the user carries this cost , he benefits directly if it can be 
kept to a minimum. The cost of accounting must be balanced by the benefits it provides for both 
the service providers and the users . 
In this article , we motivate why paying for guaranteed communication services is essential when 
the resources are limited.  We continue to discuss the conventional framework used for accounting 
in communication networks, after which a new framework is proposed. Finally a few concluding· 
remarks are made. 
2 Motivation 
A free data communication service does not exist. The infrastructure cannot be put into place and 
maintained without money. Somewhere someone pays. The question is not whether the services 
should be paid for or not , but who should pay for it . More specifically: Should the end-user be 
involved· in footing the bill or should he be buffered from the fact that his actions on the network 
cost money? 
One of the conclusions from our investigation is that the effect of a communication network ac­
counting system goes beyond the collection of money to pay for installation and maintenance. 
A basic assumption which underlies our research is that communication resources are limited and 
in many cases even scarce. If communication resources were completely unlimited , there would be 
little motivation for doing this research. 
Three objectives for invoicing the users have been identified:  
• Earn revenue. 
If earning revenue were the only objective, a simple flat-rate per network connection (regard­
less of the amount of traffic generated) can be used. This results in a very simple and cheap 
invoicing system. 
The potential uplifting effect of a completely free data communication service may even call 
for a system in which tax money is used to provide a 'free-for- all' system to the users. 
One of the limitations of paying for access only, is that it becomes difficult ,  if not impossible, 
for the user to use and directly pay for services on a remote network. The user must rely on 
the local service provider to choose which remote service provider to use, and to negotiate 
contracts with those service providers . Whereas most users would probably prefer not to be 
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bothered by these choices, we do believe that many would like t o  have a choice if different 
prices and qualities of service form part of the deal. 
• Equalize the demand. 
Studies by Parris (PF92) have shown that a differentiated pricing system which takes the · 
amount of traffic offered to the network, as well as the time of the day into account , can 
spread the load offered to the network more evenly and reduce peak loads. It should be dear 
that spreading the load is only feasible if there exist times when the network is not fully 
utilized. 
• Create fairness in availability. 
If communication resources were completely unlimited , these services would have been al­
ways available to everyone. However, if resources (link bandwidth , node buffer space, etc . )  
are limited, either performance, or  availability decreases when more users make use of  the ' 
network. 
Unguatanteed services such as those offered by TCP /IP, are shared by all users on an equal 
basis. If the load increases, the performance decreases for all users. The effect of this may 
range from mild frustration , to a complete collapse in the case of real-time applications (eg. 
video conferences ) .  
Performance guarantees (provided by either deterministic or  statistical reservation of  re­
sources) can ensure that real-time applications operate satisfactorily in the face of an increase 
in demand,  but this limits the availability of services to the rest of the users . 
If resources are limited , free to the users , but can be reserved , users will have no incentive 
to let go of any channels they have managed to reserve for themselves. In fact , there will 
be a strong incentive to never let go of any reserved resources. The 'free-for-all ' system will 
still be free - but not for all . The lucky first-comers will be the only ones served by such a 
system. 
There are more than one way to force users to let go of reserved services which they may not 
obtain easily again . A time-out on connections, for example, may free the resources for other 
users after a reasonable period of time has elapsed since establishment of the connection. 
The problem is how to determine what a 'reasonable' time-out period is. If the time-out is 
too short , it may cut off a ' live' connection . If the time-out is too long, resources are wasted.  
A time-out which starts only after the last packet (or cell) has been sent , merely shifts the 
problem to determining how long a user can reasonably be expected to remain 'silent ' on 
an open connection , before the connection is cut off. Again , if the time-out is too short , it 
may cut off a ' live' connection and if the· time-out is too long, resources are wasted.  This 
solution will furthermore prompt users to periodically send an 'I 'm-alive ' packet to keep an 
idle connection open for future use. 
We believe that services can be made available on a fair basis with an invoicing system 
which differentiates at least in terms of the type of service , the amount of data sent , and 
the duration of guaranteed connections; The purpose of the invoicing system is not only to 
generate revenue2 , but to create fairness in the availability of the resources. It creates an 
incentive to terminate connections as soon as they are not needed, and it gives users a choice 
to spend their money (or any suitable currency such as 'network tokens') on the type and 
quality of services which are important to them. 
When resources are limited, a communication network without an option to reserve guaran­
teed services and without the infra-structure to invoice users for these guaranteed services, 
leaves the users at the mercy of their fellow network users . In such a network, the perfor­
mance is determined by what other users are doing at that moment . Even if a user is willing 
to part with some of his money to obtain a better service, he has no other choice, but to try 
again late at night when the demand decreases . 
2 H earning revenue were the only objective, a Bat rate per connection provides the cheapest solution. 
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The objective of this study i s  not to limit the freedom of people using a data communication 
network by asking them to pay for every byte they send, but to add the freedom to choose a higher 
quality service if it is important enough. A flat rate per connection for all unguaranteed services 
with a differentiated invoicing system for guaranteed services is proposed. 
Although the main objective of the proposed invoicing system is to create fairness in the availability 
of resources, the other two objectives (earning revenue , and equalizing demand) must be served 
equally well . 
2 . 1  Conventional Account ing Framework 
Conventional accounting frameworks for communication services are based on the concept of a 
user account. A user must register (by filling in a form and sometimes paying a deposit) before he 
can gain access to the network .  Depending on the pricing policy used by the service provider, the 
usage information for every user is recorded and stored. At regular intervals (usually monthly) ,  an 
invoice is sent to the user . The user can then check the validity of the information on the invoice 
before paying the correct amount . If the user does not pay, the service provider can terminate the 
services until payment has been received . 
The following disadvantages and shortcomings of the conventional accounting framework have been 
identified: 
• The accounting system is in many cases very expensive. Structures must be put into- place to 
record and store the usage information for every user . An invoice must be compiled and sent 
to the user, before payment can be collected. An expensive (eg. the postal system) parallel 
communication system is sometimes used to send out invoices and collect payments. This 
cost is directly passed on to the end-user . 
• There is usually a long delay between the time at which the service is provided and the arrival 
of the invoice . If one of the objectives is to affect the usage patterns of the users in a way 
which will ensure that the demand is equalized , there should be a more direct link between 
using a specific service and paying for it. In order to adjust usage patterns in response to 
higher prices ,  a user needs to be able to distinguish which actions were expensive and which 
were cheap . Ideally, the user should know how much a service will cost even before it is used 
(generally known as a quotation) . 
• Most existing accounting systems do not stimulate competition among the service providers . 
Few applications are limited to the domain covered by one communication service provider . 
However, most existing accounting systems make it impossible for a user to directly use the 
services of a distant service provider. In some cases , the local service provider has contracts 
and agreements with the distant ones and the user is not even aware of the fact that his 
traffic is routed via 'foreign ' nodes and links. The cost of using the distant service provider 
is reflected in the local invoice and ·  payable directly to the local service provider . In these 
cases the user must simply accept the price negotiated between the service providers. 
The fact that the accounting systems are structured around the concept of an user account , 
with a long-term contract , makes it difficult (if not impossible) for users to use the services 
offered by service providers with whom they have no contract . At the same time, service 
providers cannot easily provide services directly to distant users, mainly because they have 
no direct way to collect payment. 
3 Payment Methods 
If the payment for communication services is to be included as part of the basic communication 
protocol , it has to be both fast and secure . The proposed framework for accounting in a data 
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communication· network is made possible by recent advances in techniques to implement the dig­
ital equivalent of cash. Modern cryptographic techniques make it possible to securely exchange 
payments in an open communication network .  Bruce Schneier [Sch94] and David Chaum [Cha85] 
provide detailed discussions of the theory and implementation of digital cash payment systems. 
When properly implemented , digital cash and its equivalents such as digital traveler 's cheques 
provide several advantages for payment over networks. Paying by cash is one of the simplest ways 
to do business. Cash may be accepted on face value without taking the payer 's credentials into 
account . Using digital cash to pay for communication services forms a logical extension of existing 
cash payment systems.3 
4 A Framework for Accounting in a Data Communication 
Network. 
In order to alleviate some of the limitations of conventional accounting systems, a new framework 
for accounting in data communication networks is defined. (It is important to bear in mind that it 
is assumed that the communication resources are limited in comparison to the demand for services . )  
The following features describe the proposed accounting framework: 
• In order to create fairness in the availability of resources, it is essential that users pay for the 
use of guaranteed services . Unguaranteed services may be paid for directly, or indirectly as 
part of a flat rate, or it may be free of charge. 
• Services are paid for by the entity setting up the connection. 
• The complete accounting process is implemented as part of the basic protocol used to establish 
and maintain a connection . 
• A maximum-charge field is added to the QOS specification ( also called a flow-spec in celJ 
networks) which forms part of the header of the first packet (cell) used to establish the 
connection . 
• The first acknowledgment packet from the destination contains the agreed-upon QOS pa­
rameter values,  as well as a value for the total charge of the connection. 
• In a similar way to which the delay specification is 'used up' by the nodes on the route, all 
nodes may add to the charge of the connection . The total charge for the connection is the 
sum of all the charges 'collected' on the route. 
• Not every node needs to add to the charge. A big service provider may charge connections 
only at the nodes where its domain is entered. A single charge can be calculated depending 
on where in the domain the connection terminates, or where the connection exits the domain. 
How to calculate the charge is a pricing issue which is left for the service providers to decide 
for themselves. 
• After receiving a quotation for the connection, the user can either reject the quotation, or 
accept it by induding the payment in the next packet or cell .  
• Digital cash (or any other suitable form of electronic tokens) is used for payment . These are 
cryptographically encoded to be payable only to the intended recipient. 
3 Digital cash, in more than one format, is  already available to pay for merchandise on INTERNET. Payment 
schemes offered by the DigiCash Company, the European Community's ESPRIT Program's Project CAFE, Cyber­
Cash with their INTERNET Payment Scheme, the NetCash system and the First Digital Bank founded by David 
Chaum in the Netherlands, are examples of existing systems. (Information from WWW-buyinfo home page on 
INTERNET.) 
28 • Expensive connections can be paid for incrementally, by sending the cash at regular intervals 
during the duration of the connection . In case of any network failures, disputes are limited 
to small amounts only. 
The proposed framework has a number of advantages over existing approaches: 
• Users may choose to pay for a higher quality of service when it is needed. 
• Users can directly use the services of distant service providers . There is no need to open an 
account with those service providers. 
• When source routing is used, users can select which service providers they want to use. 
• In situations where privacy is important, users may remain anonymous, while still being able 
to guarantee their payment for the communication services. 
• Service providers receive guaranteed payment for services rendered . 
• Expensive logging of usage information and sending of invoices are not necessary. 
5 Guarantees 
Guarantees always play a role when purchasing products or services. The service provider must be 
able to guarantee certain properties of the service, while the customer must be able to guarantee 
payment. Few users will be willing to pay for unguaranteed services . 
A number of different properties can be guaranteed.  High speed applications typically need guar­
antees for three properties : [Par94] 
• Worst-case loss rate, 
• Worst-case bandwidth, and 
• Worst-case delay. 
Special mechanisms are needed to ensure that these properties are guaranteed . The guarantees 
may be either deterministic, or statistical in nature. 
Deterministic guarantees promise that the values of the properties such as maximum delay, or 
minimum bandwidth will be within certain limits with a 100% probability. Resources such as link 
bandwidth and buffer space are reserved for every channel. One guaranteed channel is then not 
allowed to use the resources of another guaranteed channel, even if the second channel is not using 
it at that moment . Unused packets or cells in a guaranteed channel may only be used to forward 
unguaranteed traffic. ' 
Statistical guarantees, on the other hand,  only promise that the required parameter values will be 
within the limits with a probability of less than (but usually dose to) 100%. Resources are not 
partitioned and reserved for specific channels , but remain in a pool . Total network utilization is 
higher than for deterministic guarantees, and thus the availability of services is increased.  
A payment system cannot work without a well-designed service reservation system which provides 
service guarantees. The Real- Time Protocol Suites proposed by the Tenet Group at the Inter­
national Computer Science Institute in Berkeley, California, forms an example of such a service 
reservation system which can provide service guarantees [MN94, GF94) . 
6 Conclusion 2 9  
In this article , i t  is motivated that paying for the use of guaranteed services can ensure fairness in 
the availability of limited data communication services. 
The limitations of conventional accounting frameworks for communication services were discussed. 
A new framework for accounting in high speed networks is proposed and the advantages thereof 
pointed out .  The importance of a service reservation protocol , and the guarantees offered are also 
mentioned. 
It must be pointed out that the proposed solution forms merely a framework within which a detailed 
accounting system can be designed . 
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